COMMENTS
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND THE TERMINATION OF
CONSENT DECREES UNDER THE PRISON
LITIGATION REFORM ACT

Anne K. Heidel*
Decades of criticism regarding prisoner litigation culminated in
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA).' Taking advantage
of the increased availability of civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,2 prisoners were one of the fastest growing plaintiff classes in
the federal courts from 1960 to the present.3 In 1994, the year before
members of Congress introduced the PLRA, prisoners filed 60,086
cases in the federal courts, making up more than one-fourth of the
total number of civil cases filed nationally.4 In 1990, over 1,200 local
prison systems, including those in major cities such as New York,
Philadelphia, and Detroit, were under federal court supervision. For
the most part, this supervision stemmed from class action suits spanning many years. 6
The rise in prisoner litigation and prospective relief calling for extensive court involvement in prisons generated significant negative
attention. Prison administrators expressed frustration with judges
taking on a "micro-managing 7 function in the remedy phase of meritorious cases. Although the vast majority of cases were ultimately
J.D. Candidate, 2002, University of Pennsylvania Law School; BA, 1999, Swarthmore College.
l Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)
(codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1346, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, and other scattered
sections).
2 See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (recognizing a cause of
action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against local public officials who were not acting pursuant to any local law). Of
the 39,065 civil suits filed by prisoners alleging due process and Eighth Amendment violations
in 1994, 37,925 were § 1983 suits. See 141 CONG. REQ 14,573 (1995) (quoting Walter Berns, Sue
the Warden, Sue the Chef Sue the Gardener...,WAIL ST.J., Apr. 24, 1995, at A12).
3 See 142 CONG. REG 23,255 (1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham indicating that in 1995,
inmates filed 63,550 federal actions).
4 See 141 CONG. REG 14,572 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl citing statistics compiled
by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
5 See Criminal Oversigh WALLST.J.,June 10, 1996, at A18.
6 See, e.g., Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 166 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying
the PLRA to
seven related prison condition class action suits that began in the 1970s).
7 JOHN W. PAUER & SMHEN E. PAIIER, CONSnImONAL RIGHIS OF PRISONERS 338-39
(6th ed. 1999).

JOURNAL OFCONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 4:3

deemed without merit, administrators were overwhelmed by having
to answer discovery requests and make court appearances. 8 Local officials complained of the enormous financial and political costs of
complying with court-ordered relief and any effort to alter those
terms. Legislators blamed judicial activism for the state of prison
litigation, finding unjustified usurpation of local criminal justice systems. 10 Many judges, burdened with increasing numbers of pro se
inmate complaints on crowded dockets and prison condition class actions, called for legislative reform."
In 1995, Congress responded with the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, which was signed by President Clinton as part of the 1996 Appropriations Bill. Among other things, the PLRA places limits on
prospective relief, 13 attorney's fees, 4 in forma pauperis waivers, 5 and
the use of special masters in prison cases. 16 An analysis of the entire
Act is beyond the scope of this Comment. Instead,7 I will focus on the
immediate termination and automatic stay clauses.
Under the termination provisions, prison officials may move to
terminate decrees to which they consented before the PLRA was in
effect. Unless the court makes written findings within thirty days, extendable to ninety 18days
for good cause, that the relief meets new
•
PLRA prerequisites, the motion to terminate automatically stays the
relief.' This stay remains in effect until the court rules on the motion-a decision that the PLRA also subjects to a time limit.2°
The Supreme Court upheld these termination and automatic stay
provisions in Miller v. French,2 ' rejecting a challenge that the PLRA vioSee generally id
9 See Criminal Oversight, supranote 5, at A18 ("[T] he National Association of Attorneys
General estimates that states spend $81 million a year on prisoners' litigation."); Inmates' Suits No
Joke, BOSTON HERALD,Jan. 11, 1997, at 12.
10 See 140 CONG. REC 18,695 (1994) (statement of Sen. Dole, future PLRA sponsor,
supporting the nomination ofJustice Breyer to the Supreme Court based on Breyer's relatively conservative record on prison litigation because Dole believed "the last thing we need is another activist Warren Court").
n See, e.g., Gabel v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 124, 125 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (noting
the
court's impatience with "frivolous or malicious appeals" and threatening future sanctions).
12 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). For legislative history, see infta notes
32-37.
13 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (a), (b) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1995)
(requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies before filing new claims).
14 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2001).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(1998).
16 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f) (2000).
17 Id. § 3626 (b) (2), (e)(2).
18 Id. § 3626(e) (3).
19 Id. § 3626(e) (2).
2D Id. § 3626(e) (1) (mandating thatjudges "shall promptly rule on
any motion to ... terminate prospective relief.... Mandamus shall lie to remedy any failure to issue a prompt ruling. . .. ").
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
8
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lated separation of powers principles. The majority rejected the Department of Justice's interpretation of the automatic stay provision,
although this reading would have avoided the separation of powers
question.2 Five Justices found that Congress could change the substantive law underlying terms of prospective relief, even if this overrode a federal judge's prior order of equitable relief.23 This Miller
holding is consistent with a general trend over the last twenty years of
limiting federal equitable powers, particularly in institutional reform
litigation, through narrow interpretation of civil rights statutes and
deference to congressional action.24
Bolstered by Miller, parties have successfuly terminated many of
the major consent decrees governing prison conditions pursuant to
the PLRA?' Few viable legal challenges to the PLRA remain for
plaintiffs faced with imminent termination of consent decrees. This
Comment assumes that Miller, combined with widespread political
support for the PLRA, practically forecloses any arguments based on
an assertion that federal equity.powersjustify remedial intrusion into
state and local autonomy. Miller explicitly rejected the separation of
powers argument.2 Lower courts have also effectively disposed of argumnents that the termination provisions violate equal protection.2'
2I

at 336-41.

23IdM at 341-46.
24 Most notably

in Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court in-

creasingly granted broad relief in civil rights litigation. This trend peaked in the 1970s. See, e.g.,
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that federal courts could not force Detroit to
redraw its boundaries because the surrounding counties were not responsible for constitutional
violations). Since Milliken, federal courts have generally been conservative in approving class
action injunctive relief. For an example of this trend, see City ofLos Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983), which imposed a strict standing test for injunctive relief, and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,
481 U.S. 1 (1987), which mandated abstention from exercising federal equity powers during
state civil proceedings. For a summary placing the restrictions on federal equity power in the
context of the federalism debate, see Ann Althouse, How To Build a Separate Sphere: Federal
Courts and State Power,100 HARv. L REV. 1485 (1987).
a, See, e.g., Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996) (granting motion to terminate decree affecting South Carolina prisons); Martin v. Ellandson, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (S.D. Iowa
2000) (granting same for Iowa State Penitentiary); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir.
1997) (remanding with instructions to terminate decree for state prison conditions); Hadix v.
Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998) (remanding with instructions to consider merits of motion to terminate relief in a case involving Michigan prisons); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d
1424 (11th Cir. 1997) (remanding with instructions to terminate relief concerning death row
conditions in Florida); Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F. Supp. 2d 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting termination motion in all but two types of violations in New York City jails); Benjamin v. Jacobson,
124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997) (granting termination motion for conditions in New York City pretrial detention facilities, conditioned on an interpretation of the PLRA that has been foreclosed
by Miller).
In fact, separation of powers principles are increasingly invoked by defendants in institutional reform cases, rather than prisoners. Defendants have successfully argued that federal
court intervention in local prison system management violates separation of powers as well as
federalism principles. See, e.g., Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying
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The Miller majority, however, explicitly left one constitutional issue unresolved. Plaintiffs faced with a termination motion may still
claim, as a factual matter, that the time limit imposed by the automatic stay clause deprives them of procedural due process by impairing the right to present evidence at a hearing.28 Rather than relying
on theories of equity jurisdiction or the proper role of courts as catalysts for social change, the due process argument rests on a practical
presentation of plaintiffs' position-the PLRA violates plaintiffs'
rights2 by denying them a full and fair adjudication of their constitutional and statutory claims before previously ordered relief is automatically stayed and ultimately terminated.
This Comment examines the potential of this due process claim.
Part I reviews the PLRA and its impact on pre-existing class action
litigation by prisoners, examining Miller v. French and several lower
court cases. I emphasize how the termination and automatic stay
clauses have affected the final outcome of the litigation. Part II analyzes the challenges made to termination in these cases. For plaintiffs
facing termination of relief, I propose an argument that the PLRA
mechanism effectively deprives them of due process rights to a fair
and full hearing of alleged violations and appropriate remedies. Part
III discusses and addresses counter-arguments to the assertion that
the PLRA violates due process rights. Part IV draws conclusions
about the availability and likely legal success of the due process claim.
A constitutional challenge to these provisions presents a final
chance to preserve remedies for unlawful conditions in prison systems. Even if courts recognize that the termination and automatic
stay provisions are unconstitutional because of their time limits, it will
be a limited victory for prisoners' rights. Some plaintiff classes would
be afforded more time to challenge termination of their consent decrees, yet few of these plaintiffs would be able to meet the PLRA's
standards for prospective relief. Moreover, a procedural attack does
not affect the PLRA's substantive diminution of prisoners' rights.
The narrow focus of this Comment is a function of the state of pris-

relief under § 1983 to a prisoner, relying in part on the recognition that prison administration
is committed to legislative and executive responsibility and "separation of powers concerns
counsel a policy ofjudicial restraint") (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987)) (citations omitted); In re Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 1998) (deferring to defendant's
position with respect to security concerns, noting "the administration of state prisons is a matter
consigned to the states as part of their sovereign power to enforce the criminal law").
See, e.g., the cases discussed supra note 25.
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970) (holding that due process requires a fair
hearing before welfare benefits may be terminated).
See U.S. CONS. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law"); U.S. CONS. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.").
30 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (2) (2000).
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oners' civil rights law. The limited nature of a constitutional critique
of two PLRA clauses also suggests that significant change will only
come from legislative and political change, not from the courts.
I. THE IMPACT OF THE PLRA TERMINATION CLAUSE
A. Background of the PLRA
In May 1995, Senator Dole introduced the first version of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, modeled after an Arizona law. 31 This
version focused on filing fees and requirements for new prospective
relief; it did not address the termination of pre-existing relief. The
final version, which was the first to include the termination provisions, appeared in the 1996 Appropriations Bill. President Clinton
signed the Bill containing the PLRA in April 1996.s
During discussions of the Appropriations Bill, Senator Kennedy
labeled the PLRA "patently unconstitutional" and "a dangerous legislative incursion into the work of the judicial branch."
Kennedy
criticized congressional leaders for enacting far-reaching federal
court regulation as part of an Appropriations Bill, without a Judiciary
Committee mark-up, report, or hearing.3" In addition to interfering
with satisfactory settlements and disrupting judicial oversight, Kennedy warned that the PLRA would be a dangerous precedent for
"stripping the Federal courts of the ability to safeguard the civil rights
of powerless and disadvantaged groups."s
Four Senators joined
Kennedy in an unsuccessful appeal to then-Attorney General Reno,
asking her to negotiate changes to the PLRA before the Administration signed a version of the Appropriations Bill.3 7
31 141 CONG. REC 14570 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole on Introduced Bills andJoint Resolutions, S. 866: A Bill to Reform Prison Litigation to the Committee on the Judiciary). Dole
introduced a "new and improved" version four months later, joined by Senators Hatch, Abraham, Kyl, Reid, Specter, Hutchinson, Thurmond, Santorum, Bond, D'Amato, and Gramm. See
141 CONG. REQ 26548 (1995).
This version of the PLRA, written primarily by Senator Abraham (R-MI), remained the
same throughout the budget debates. See Title VII §§ 801-810 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-140, § 1(a), 110 Stat. 1327. The Appropriations Bill was signed in April 1996, following a prior presidential veto and a partial government shutdown.
As codified, the PLRA amends scattered sections of the U.S. Code, Titles 18, 28, and 42.
See supranote 2.
142 CONG. REQ 5193 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
5 See id
3d & at 5194-95.
7See hi. Senator Simon also introduced the testimony of Associate Attorney General
Schmidt before the Senate Judiciary Committee, outlining practical problems and potential
constitutional challenges to the termination provisions, as discussed in the context of another
measure, "Stop Turning Out Prisoners." Overhaulingthe Nation's Prisons, available at 1995 WL
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1. The TerminationProvisions

The termination and automatic stay clauses of the PLRA affect
prospective relief ordered before the passage of the Act. The termination clause provides in relevant part:
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by
the court that the reliefis narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to

correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. as
Any relief agreed to before the PLRA was adopted must now be
narrowly drawn-necessary to correct the violations and the least intrusive means-in order to survive. Under the automatic stay clause,
a judge has only thirty days to make written findings to this effect or
else the motion to terminate automatically stays the relief.39 Ajudge
may extend this deadline for sixty additional days for good cause. If
the district court fails to rule on the termination motion promptly,
the defendants can file a writ of mandamus, 4' allowing the appellate
court to order an immediate decision.
B. Effects on Pre-ExistingClass Action Litigation,

After the Miller decision, defendants have a clear prerogative to
move for termination of prospective relief without a separation of
powers challenge. Plaintiffs faced with termination of prospective relief may try to steer prison officials towards settlement before these
officials move for termination.4 Alternatively, upon a showing that
the ongoing relief is still necessary and the least intrusive means to
496910 (July 27, 1995) ("[T]he application of proposed 18 U.S.C. 3626(b) to orders in preenactment final judgments would raise serious constitutional problems.").
S 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (2) (2000) (emphasis added).
I& § 3626(e) (2).
40 Id. § 3626(e) (3) (noting that "general congestion of the court's calendar"
does not qualify
as good cause to extend). This extension was part of the 1997 amendments to the PLRA. See
Pub. L. No. 105-119, tit. I, § 123(a), Nov. 26, 1997, 111 Stat. 2470.
41 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) (1) (2000).
42 For a general discussion of the effect of the PLRA on reducing filings,
see a statistical
study published in the Newsletter of the Federal Courts, available at http://v.uscourts.gov
/ttb/dec99ttb/ prisoner.html ("After the PLRA went into effect in April 1996, filings of civil
rights prisoner petitions dropped 20% from 1996 to 1997, then fell 12% from 1997 to 1998.
The number of filings spiked intermittently after 1996, but levels continued below pre-PLRA
enactment levels."). The precise effect of the PLRA on class actions is difficult to assess, despite
compelling statistics. As of September 30, 1997, there were 94 prisoner class action civil rights
claims pending in the United States District Courts. As of September 30, 1999, there were no
such cases pending. Compare http://www.uscourts. gov/judicialbusiness/xO4sep97.pdf with
http/v/www.uscourts.gov/judbusl999/x5sep99.pdf (visited Feb. 9, 2002).
See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, infra notes 60, 64-71.
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correct ongoing violations, plaintiffs might be able to persuade
judges to make the requisite findings within thirty, or potentially
ninety, days, leaving the relief intact. A final option is for plaintiffs to
challenge a motion for an automatic stay under the PLRA on other
constitutional grounds, such as due process.
In Miller v. French,44 Harrisv. City ofPhiladelphia,4 Hadix v. Johnson,4r
and Benjamin v. Jacobson,a plaintiffs facing termination of consent decrees raised due process claims to challenge the termination and
automatic stay clauses. These due process claims were largely overshadowed, at least at the appellate level, by the separation of powers
issue before the Miller decision. 48 To assess the viability of a due process challenge to the termination of relief, plaintiffs must consider
how receptive courts have been to other PLRA challenges. The following discussion of four federal cases provides a background for this
analysis.
1. Cases Applying the Automatic Stay Clause
a. Miller v. French
The Supreme Court's treatment of the PLRA in Miller v. French49 is
the best starting point for this analysis. Miller began in 1975, when
pro se inmates sought injunctive relief under § 1983 against a state
prison administrator in Pendleton, Indiana.-4 The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed a remedial order finding Eighth Amendment violations and imposing capacity limits, rules about the use of mechanical
restraints, and standards regarding staffing, food, and medical services.5"' With minor modifications, the injunction remained in effect
until June 5, 1997 when the State filed a motion to terminate the relief under the PLRA. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the automatic stay, citing both due process and
separation of powers principles. The district court granted the or-

44 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).

Harris v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A. 82-1847, 2000 WL 1239948 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30,
2000).
Hadix v.Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
47 Benjamin v.Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997).
43 This focus appears to be one of judicial discretion rather than the scope
of litigants' arguments. See, e.g., French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437,447 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,528 U.S.
1045 (1999), rev'd, Miller 530 U.S. 327 ("This [separation of powers] conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to reach the alternate constitutional grounds on which the prisoners have relied.").
49 Miller,530 U.S. at
327.
W French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Ind. 1982).
51 French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1985).
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der 52 and the United States intervened to defend the constitutionality

of the PLRA automatic stay.53 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that the automatic stay clause violated separation
of powers and, thus, finding it unnecessary to reach the prisoners'
due process claims. 54
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs repeated their
argument that the automatic stay clause violated separation of powers
in prescribing a rule of decision for the courts. A five-member majority disagreed with the Seventh Circuit and upheld the automatic stay,
remanding the case for termination proceedings. Writing for the
majority, Justice O'Connor emphasized that prospective relief is subject to changes in the substantive law because it lacks the finality of
compensatory relief£ The controversial automatic stay clause "helps
to implement the change in the law;" 57 but it does not dictate how
courts must rule on each motion. Justice O'Connor acknowledged,
however, that the Court had concerns about the "relative brevity"• of
the time limit for judges to rule on the termination motion before relief is automatically stayed:
[W] hether the time limit is so short that it deprives litigants of a meaningful opportunity to be heard is a due process question, an issue that is
not before us. We leave open, therefore, the question whether this time
limit, sarticularly in a complex case, may implicate due process concerns.
As dicta, this open question is not central to the holding of Miller,
but indicates that influential members of the Supreme Court recognize that the actual time limits might pose concerns beyond separation of powers principles.

52

See Duckworth, 178 F.3d at 440. After a hearing, the judge entered the order on July 11,

1997 converting the TRO into a preliminary injunction. See id.
53 Although the Justice Department generally supported the PLRA, it advocated a lenient
interpretation of the automatic stay clause in the Miller litigation and its Supreme Court brief.
Such posturing invited criticism from congressional supporters of the PLRA. See 142 CONG.
REC 23,257 (1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham) ("What we have seen is the Department of
Justice intervening in lawsuits in a way that would, in fact, preclude, rather than allow, States to
extricate themselves from these various judicial circumstances... [and] finding ways to allow
the judges to stay in charge.").
54 Duckworth, 178 F.3d at 447-48 (7th Cir. 1999). The grounds for this decision limited the
scope of Supreme Court review to the separation of powers argument.
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
Id at 349 ("Rather than prescribing a rule of decision, § 3626(e) (2) simply imposes the
consequences of the court's application of the new legal standard.").
57 Id. at 348-49 (distinguishing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146
(1872), where the
Court held a statute unconstitutional because it purported to "prescribe rules of decision").
58 Id. at 350.
!1 Id-
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b. Harris v. City of Philadelphia
In Harris v. City of Philadelphia,a pro se complainant challenging
prison conditions initiated an eighteen-year-long class action involving all inmates in the Philadelphia Prison System ("PPS"). 6° When
Harrisbegan in 1982, the City's prison capacity was more than double
what 6!it was supposed to be under a prior, independent consent decree.
In a remedial order, Harris plaintiffs surrendered damage
claims in exchange for City promises to build a new prison facility by
1990 and comply with prison capacity limits.62 The district court
amended the consent order in 1989, citing violations by the City including excessive prison population and delays in the construction of
the Criminal Justice Center.63 These modifications and the City's
compliance generated protracted litigation. 64 The case captured national attention, highlighting both the recalcitrance of City prison officials and the extensive control exercised by the districtjudge.6
The PLRA's effect in Harriswas indirect. In late 1999, the district
judge encouraged both sides to settle, preempting a motion to stay
the relief. In an August 2000 order approving the settlement terms,
the judge indicated that reviewing the record to assess whether the
PLRA permitted continuing relief would have been impractical.6
While conditions in 1982 justified court intervention, conditions had
slowly improved in some areas, leaving the propriety of the consent
decree unclear under the new PLRA standards. The "only thing
clear," according to the judge, "is the time, expense and uncertainT'
of litigation over whether relief could be continued after the PLRA.

60 See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIVA82-1847, 2000 WL 1239948 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
30,
2000).
61 See Jackson v. Hendrick, 457 Pa. 405, 406 (1974) (discussing the holding of a "special

three-judge court [finding] that confinement in [Philadelphia] prisons constituted cruel and
unusual punishment").
See Harris v. Pernsley, 645 F. Supp. 1042, 1045-48 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
63 SeeHarris v. Pernsley, No. CIV.A.82-1847, 1989 WL 16269 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 1989)
at *2.
64 See, e.g., Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1342 (3d Cir. 1995); Harris v. City of PhiladeIhia, 137 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 1998).
Supporters of the PLRA frequently cited the Harris case. See 141 CONG. REC. 35,980
(1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (discussing the situation in Philadelphia where "American
citizens are put at risk every day by court decrees that curb prison crowding," which "pose an
enormous threat to public safety"); CriminalOversight, supranote 5, at A18 (describing the allegedly disastrous effects of releasing 10,000 suspects and arrestees under the charge-based bail
policy implemented by Hanisto meet population caps).
Harris v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIVA82-1847, 2000 WL 1239948 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30,
2000).
67 Id. at *10.
6Id.
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According to Judge Shapiro in Harris,the final settlement was in
the best interests of the plaintiff class, even if it did not meet all of the
demands sought during the litigation. Judge Shapiro noted:
Eighteen years is generally the age at which a child is declared emancipated. Therefore, subject to the [control of bond funds for plumbing
work], the court approves the settlement of the parties... and declares
the City emancipated from federal court supervision of the PPS. 6
The settlement ordered the dismissal of the case and termination
of the two consent decrees in exchange for the City hiring two consultants to monitor conditions in its prisons and making certain
physical improvements to the House of Correction. 70
Even if the judge could have exhaustively reviewed the record in
ninety days, finding ongoing violations might not have satisfied the
PLRA's requirement that the prospective relief be necessary and the
least intrusive method to remedy such violations. If the court met
this burden in examining conditions after the ninety-day limit expired, reinstatement of prospective relief after it had been stayed
would be "administrative chaos. 71 Settlement appeared the best option to protect plaintiffs' interests while promoting judicial economy
and the public interest.
For many plaintiffs facing a PLRA termination motion, settlement
may not be an option, particularly since the threat of consent decree
termination puts prisoners in a weak bargaining position. As dis-'
cussed below, some lower courts have devised alternative arguments
to avoid the likely consequences of a motion to terminate prospective
relief and an automatic stay.
c. Hadix v.Johnson
Hadix was a prisoner lawsuit filed in Detroit, Michigan. After
twenty years of litigation, the Hadix defendants took immediate advantage of the PLRA and moved for termination of the consent decree. The district court found the termination clause unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds. 73 The Supreme Court's
Miller decision74 foreclosed this argument on appeal. The plaintiffs
had raised equal protection and due process claims, but the district
court did not consider them at trial. 7 5 On remand, 76 the district court

Id at *11.
71

Id

at *8.
See Hadix v.Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996).

See id
74 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
SeeJohnson, 947 F. Supp. at 1102.

Apr. 2002]

PRISONL1TIGATIONREFORMACT

terminated some of the remedial orders, but conditioned termination of others on substantial compliance with the terms of the order."
The Sixth Circuit rejected this approach, chastising the district
judge for failing to make the findings that the PLRA requires for sustaining prospective relief.7s On appeal, the Hadix plaintiffs specifically objected to the termination of parts of the prospective relief
without an evidentiary hearing.9 The Sixth Circuit agreed, adopting
an interpretation of the PLRA that differed from that advanced by
the Supreme Court in Millerv. French s
Because the PLRA directs a... court to look to current conditions, and because the existing record at the time the motion for termination is filed
vill often be inadequate for purposes of this determination, the party
opposing termination must be given the opportunity to submit additional evi81
denc in an effort to show current and ongoing constitutional violations.

As support, the court cited decisions from other circuits.8 It acknowledged, however, that this interpretation of the automatic stay
clause was not universals 3
In its remand instructions, the Sixth Circuit ordered that if the
parties could not reach a complete settlement within thirty days, the
district court should schedule an evidentiary hearing within the next
thirty days.Y The court would then have sixty days after the hearing
began to issue an opinion applying the PLRA to the termination mo-

See Hadix v.Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. deniedsub nom. Hadixv. McGinnis,
524 U.S. 952 (1998).
SeeHadixv.Johnson, 45F. Supp. 2d 584,587-89 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (changing the effect of
the automatic stay clause).
SeeHadix v.Johnson, 228 F.3d 662, 671 (6th Cir. 2000).
See id.
s See id
81Id. at 671 (emphasis on "termination must be.. ." added).
Id. at 672 (citing Loyd v. Ala. Dep't of Corr., 176 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 1999), cert.
76

denied, 528 U.S. 1061 (1999) (denying plaintiffs a chance to submit evidence "reads all meaning
out of" from the termination clause); Benvanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834, 839-40 (7th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing if there are disputed issues of
material fact); Benjamin v.Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 166 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the "district court must allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to show current and ongoing violations of
their federal rights"); Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that seekers
of prospective relief under the PLRA must be given an opportunity to present their claims).
The Court also referred to several district courts that have allowed such a hearing. See, e.g., Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397, 406 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (permitting plaintiffs an opportunity to show that constitutional violations exist at the county jail); Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.
Supp. 727, 733 (D.V.i 1997) ("Based on the testimony taken and the evidence submitted at the
hearing, the court finds that conditions... do not meet minimal, constitutional standards.").
83 See, e-g., Cagle v. Hutto, 177 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S.
1264
(2000) (denying a right to an evidentiary hearing in all cases, although noting that district court
may hold a hearing and must do so if the plaintiff alleges "specific facts which, if true, would
amount to a current and ongoing constitutional violation").
84 Hadx, 228 F.3d at 673.
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tion.85 Although this interpretation of the automatic stay clause could
be construed as inconsistent with the intent of Congress in enacting
the PLRA time limits, it has been adopted by at least one other district court.86

d. Benjamin v. Jacobson
In its interpretation of the automatic stay clause before the Supreme Court decided Miller v. French, the Second Circuit in Benjamin
v. Jacobson took a unique approach. 87 New York City signed a consent
decree in 1978 govemingjyre-trial detention facilities. It remained in
place for eighteen years. When faced with a motion to terminate
pursuant to the PLRA, the district court granted the motion over
s The Second Circuit
challenges to the Act.m
affirmed, but relied on its
unique reading of the PLRA's termination and stay clauses. 9° The
court noted that, unlike final court judgments, Congress could
change the law underlying consent decrees. 1 It emphasized, however, that the consent decree was not itself vacated-federal courts
simply could not enforce it.92 State courts could still enforce it as a
contract under state law.93 In Miller v. French, the Supreme Court rejected this reading.94
When Benjamin was remanded, the district court adopted the logic
of Hadix, holding that the nature of the litigation required the judge
9
to use his equitable powers to grant more time to collect evidence. 5
Eighteen months later, after gathering and evaluating evidence, the
district judge finally ruled on the motion to terminate relief.9 6 Noting
the departure from the timeframe indicated by the PLRA, the judge
wrote:
I am only beginning to appreciate the complexities which the defendants' motion poses for both the litigants and the Court .... The hearing itself spanned five days .... Post-trial briefing consumed an additional five weeks. This Court has made every effort to decide this motion
8Id.

See infra notes 88-93 (describing the approach adopted by district court in Benjamin v.

Jacobson).

87 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997).

Id. at 165.

See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

9D See Benjamin, 124 F.3d 162.
91

Id at 171.

9id"

Id. at 167.
See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336-37.

See Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 CIV. 3073 HB, 1999 WL 1225264 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (suspending the automatic stay until the court ruled on the motion).
9 Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F. Supp. 2d 157 (S.D.N.Y.
2000). The district court issued its decision about two weeks before the Supreme Court decided Miller.
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as expeditiously as the circumstances allow, but in the interests of thoroughness and faimess, and in light of the massive record and the complexity of the issues, it is not until today that this decision is rendered. 9
After reviewing the new record and substantive law, the judge
terminated relief concerning law libraries and inmate correspondence. He ordered, however, new narrowly-tailored relief to address
the use of mechanical restraints and attorney visitation rights.9
The Hadix and Benjamin courts took it upon themselves to provide
for evidentiary hearings and to suspend the automatic stay clause.
Since many judges will not do so, plaintiffs must take the initiative to
demand such an evidentiary hearing. If the issue is raised, courts will
have to evaluate the legal basis for bending the PLRA time limit. By
adopting the practical logic and experience of Hadix and Benjamin,
yet framing the issue in terms of procedural due process, plaintiffs
may maximize their chances of being granted additional time to attempt to save remedial orders governing prison conditions.
II. THE PLRA AUTOMATIC STAY CLAUSE AND DUE PROCESS
In Harris,9 Hadix,10' and Benjamin,101 the PLRA would have automatically stayed relief unless the judges had sought alternative ways of
enforcing a version of remedial relief. Although the parties reached
a settlement in Harris,defendant officials will rarely agree to settlement where they have the option of moving for termination altogether. Settlement could be a viable option where public or federal
government scrutiny makes termination appear irresponsible for the
local prison system. Settlement is also more likely where the Court
may, in fact, find ongoing violations that warrant some variation of
prospective relief, as this process will pose additional, burdensome
litigation on the defendants. The separation of powers argument,
even with the Second Circuit's assertion that state law could still enforce the consent decree, does not hold much promise in the wake of
Miller. If the plaintiffs want a chance to submit additional evidence as
to ongoing violations, they must articulate other legal grounds for being entitled to this opportunity.
In some factual circumstances, plaintiffs may successfully argue
that a stay and eventual termination of relief, without adequate review of whether relief is still justified under the strict new guidelines

97

Id.at 160-61.

98See id.at 168-78.
99 See supra notes 61-71.
100See supranotes 72-86.
101See supranotes 87-98.
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of the PLRA, violates due process. The next section analyzes the due
process right to a fair and full hearing in the prison litigation context.
A. Latent Supportfrom the Supreme Court
The legal argument for a procedural due process violation fundamentally differs from the separation of powers argument, the argument that has captured more attention in the courts. In Miller,Justice O'Connor wrote:
In contrast to due process, which principally serves to protect the personal rights of litigants to a full and fair hearing, separation of powers
principles are primarily addressed to the structural concerns of protecting the role of the independent Judiciary within the constitutional de. 102
sign.
These structural arguments were precisely those the majority of
the Court squarely rejected. However, during oral arguments, the
Court seemed impatient for one03of the parties to make or address the
practical due process argument.
Justices asked both sides if they had found any statutes other than
the PLRA with such a limited time period and consequences as drastic as erasing a prior judgment. ' In discussing the automatic stay
clause in Miller,Justice Breyer told the attorney for the United States:
"I don't believe it's conceivable that you could deal with something
like [the complicated, twenty-year long prison litigation in Puerto
Rico] in 90 days." 10 5 If that is a typical case, Breyer continued, Congress might be asking district court judges to "do the impossible," 0
suggesting that their purpose was to end everything within ninety
days rather than just speed up the process of prison litigation.'0 7 The
attorney responded that courts could terminate such complicated decrees "piecemeal" and defended congressional intent by submitting
that Congress had, in fact, rejected an earlier version that would have
simply ended all relief after two years.108
In questioning the prisoners' attorney, several Justices focused on
the time limit of the automatic stay clause. While the attorney kept
returning to his separation of powers argument, the Court forced
him to consider whether there would be a constitutional challenge if
102Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000).
103 See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *40, Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327

(2000) (Apr. 18, 2000) (No. 99-224), 2000 WL 486734.

104Id
105 Id at *32 (referencing Morales Feliciano v. Romero Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14 (D.P.R

1979)).
10 Id at *33.
107 Id

1osId. at *33-34.
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the statute gave judges enough time to adjudicate, such as two
years.'0 The attorney conceded that it would be "much more problematic" to claim that the PLRA violated separation of powers if the
Court simply failed to act within this hypothetical two-year time
limit."0 When the attorney started to return to his structural argument, Justice Souter interjected:
Why do you say more-you're talking about due process then, not separation of powers. If the change in time is the crux for you, all you're talking about is whether Congress has provided enough time for these people to have the court make the proper decision.II
The appellee contended that the separation of powers argument
meant that the PLRA would still be unconstitutional even if it gave
courts ten years to assess whether relief was still justified. This claim
was based on the constitutional legal theory that Congress simply
a judicial decree unless the substantive law has accannot terminate
12
tually changed.

Two of the dissenters, Justices Breyer and Stevens, adopted the Solicitor General's interpretation of the automatic stay clause, which
gives judges discretion to modify or suspend the stay under traditional equity principles.13 Their dissenting opinion indicates that a
truly automaticstay would violate separation of powers and due proc-

Breyer emphasized the "complexity" of many consent decrees
ess.
and the volume of evidence that judges would have to review in assessing a motion to terminate." Given these circumstances, "[n] inety
days might not provide sufficient time to ascertain the views of several
different parties, including monitors, to allow them to present evidence, and to permit each to respond to the arguments and evidence
of others."" 6 Without time to consider the current conditions, judges
may end up having to reinstate the relief while leaving "constitution7
ally prohibited conditions unremedied, at least temporarily.",1
The remaining Miller dissenters, Justices Ginsburg and Souter,
agreed with the majority that there was clear congressional intent to
make the automatic stay non-discretionary."8 In deciding whether
this imposition was constitutional, Justices Souter and Ginsburg

109

Id. at *39.

110 Id. at *40.

III Id.
112 Id. at *41-42.
11 Miller, 530 U.S. at 354 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
114 Id.
115 d. at 355-57.
16
117

Id. at 357.
Id.
at 350-51 (Souter, J., dissenting).
I18
Yd.
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would have remanded for a determination of whether the timing was
so short as to violate principles of separation of powers. n 9
B. The Due ProcessArgument
This Millerdialogue between the Justices and the litigants demonstrates that plaintiffs forming a due process claim must present a factintensive argument. The argument is that, at a minimum, class
members have the right to ajudge's meaningful evaluation of the extent of compliance with the consent decree, the nature of outstanding violations, the new requirements imposed by Congress, and the
"balance of equities."'2 ° The termination clause, combined with the
automatic stay provision, does not protect this right. Justice Breyer's
question at oral argument suggests the empirical reality that institutional reform litigation cases are, more often than not, quite complex. 12 ' If the clause is enforced as a mandatory time period, class
members will be deprived of meaningful access to the courts because
judges will be unable to evaluate years of litigation in the ninety days
allotted for the determination of whether the terms of relief meet
new statutory requirements.
Plaintiffs should draw upon Hadix and Benjamin, in which judges
indicate the need to delay the automatic stay for an evidentiary hearing. Plaintiffs must assert first that termination of relief without an
adequate opportunity to prove the existence of ongoing violations
and the need for relief to the judge violates due process; and second,
the automatic stay must be suspended pending such an evidentiary
opportunity because of the administrative chaos of reinstating partial
relief. 22
The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'
Although the Rehnquist Court has constrained prisoners' rights,124 it
19

Id.at 352-53 ("Whether this constitutional issue arises on the facts of this action... is

something we cannot yet tell ....If the District Court determined both that it lacked adequate
time to make the requisite findings in the period before the automatic stay would become effective, and that applying the stay would violate the separation of powers, the question would then
be properly presented.").
120See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (describing the balance
of factors
when interpreting what procedural due process is under different circumstances).
121See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL
POL1CY-MAING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOWTHE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 34-50 (1998) (giving an overview of prison reform litigation after 1960).
122 See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.82-1847, 2000 WL 1239948 at *11 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 30, 2000).
12 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (distinguishing the aspects
of due process
that are relevant to prisoners' rights).
124 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (imposing an
actual injury requirement on
prisoners' assertion of a constitutional violation).
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has not overruled the basic principle articulated byJustice Thurgood
Marshall:
It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutionalright
of access to the courts. This Court recognized that right more than 35 years

ago... recent decisions have struck down restrictions and required remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the courts is adequate, ef-

fective, and meaningful125

This principle has, however, been limited. Prisoners are not guaranteed counsel for their civil complaints,126 may be required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing in court,'2 and are subject
to other limitations imposed by Congress and local legislatures, such
as the PLRA limits on fees.1'3 Having the right to submit evidence in
an existing court proceeding, however, is fumdamental to justice and
therefore cannot be "legislated away. "12
With "meaningful access" to the courts as the "touchstone," states
must at least "assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity
to present his claims fairly."' This argument does not challenge the
terms of Lewis v. Casey, which held that the Constitution does not
guarantee inmates the ability....to litigate effectively
by providing coun131
sel on appeal or sophisticated law libraries.
When presenting the
due process argument in the PLRA context, plaintiffs are simply asking for meaningful access, not special accommodations. The right to
present evidence is one of the factors that courts require when evaluating whether administrative proceedings comport with procedural
due process.12
Where prisoner plaintiffs have already succeeded by way of a civil
action and are at risk of losing years of work to assure adequate living
conditions, it is crucial that they at least have the opportunity to meet
the burden of the PLRA. In civil rights litigation, prisoners have fre12

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-22 (1977) (citations omitted and emphasis added)

(holding that prisoners' fundamental right of access to the courts requires prison officials to
provide law libraries and legal assistance to inmates).
1-%See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (recognizing a right to counsel only in
criminal cases).
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (a) (listing requirements for prisoners before
taking legal action).
12
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (clarifying statutory restraints that may be placed on the procedures).
2 See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) ("The right to
a hearing embraces not
only the right to present evidence .... ."); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 315 (1950) ("process which is a mere gesture is not due process"). See also Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (holding that, at a minimum, procedural due process is an entitlement to be heard when one's rights may be affected).
10 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974) (distinguishing the minimum
requirements necessary for meaningful access).
SLewis, 518 U.S. at 354 (requiring that inmates demonstrate "actual injury"
in order to prevail in their claim that the prison law library was inadequate).
132 See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 211 (1990); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 183 (1982);Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433 (1944).
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quently been denied such basic procedural due process.ss Common
law actually barred prisoners from filing civil suits for due process or
other violations until 1964, when the Court held that prisoners could
use § 198 3 .'m Prisoners have won hard-fought legal battles for the extension of due process guarantees.135 These guarantees are vulnerable, however, as support ebbs for prisoners' rights and civil rights
litigation under § 1983.'36
III. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THE ASSERTION THAT THE
TERMINATION AND AUTOMATIC STAY CLAUSES AS
IMPLEMENTED BY MOST COURTS VIOLATE DUE PROCESS

A. 'Automatic"Means Automatic
The most basic argument against the claim that plaintiffs are entifled to an evidentiary hearing before the PLRA automatic stay takes
effect is a textual one. The clause reads: "any motion to modify or
terminate prospective relief... shall operate as a stay during the period... beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed."1 37 The
imposition of the thirty-day deadline and the subsequent congressional amendment to extend the period before relief is stayed by sixty
days indicate that the PLRA was intended to bind courts to a strict
timetable.
In addition, the Supreme Court in Miller has already rejected a
reading of the clause that allowed judges to suspend the automatic
stay. The two Justices who adopted the interpretation given by the
Justice Departmentss based this support on the equitable powers of
federal judges.

133 For background, see Tiffany Werner, Note, Due Process
Rights of Prisoners,28 SETON HALL
L. REV. 650 (1997) (discussing due process holdings in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972);
Wilwording v. Swanson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); and Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)).
im Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (allowing prisoner to use § 1983 to
overcome War-

den's motion to dismiss).
13 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974) (finding that where state created right to
.good-time credit," prisoner's interest therein was a "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, which entitles him to minimum procedures required by the due process clause);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (holding pro se prisoner's complaint deserves the same
standard of review on the pleadings as other plaintiffs' complaints).
13 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)
(lowering standard for what constitutes a liberty
interest); Lewis, 518 U.S. 343 (creating new, harsher, pleading requirements for prisoners); see
also Harry Blackmun, Section 1983 and FederalProtection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1985) (arguing against a watering down of

§ 1983).

18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) (2) (emphasis added).
See Implementation of Prisoners Rights Litigation: HearingBefore the Senate Judiciary
Comm.,
104th Cong. (1996) (statement ofJohn Schmidt, Associate Attorney General); Miller v. French,
137
18
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Response
When considering the PLRA, the courts cannot assume that Congress meant for them to do the impossible, that is, make evidentiary
findings without the relevant evidence. In cases where an evidentiary
hearing is clearly required, this allowance does not countermand the
underlying intent of Congress to limit prospective relief to what is
necessary and appropriate. While the judges in Hadix and Benjamin
do not elaborate on their reading of the clause, they indicate that residual equity powers allow them to alter the timing in order to preserve a balance of equities. ' -9 Allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to

present evidence and letting the judge suspend the automatic stay
pending an evidentiary hearing can be justified on equitable grounds
as well as due process grounds.
Delaying the automatic stay until after an evidentiary hearing
would cure the due process violation in this section of the PLRA. Because Congress did not fully consider the due process implications of
the statute, courts should read the PLRA in a manner that puts it in
least conflict with the Constitution.1 40
B. The EvidentiaryHearingWill Burden PrisonAdministratorsand
DisruptPrisonAdministration
In Wolff v. McDonnell the Court held that "the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to... present documentary
evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.' 4 Such
considerations are relevant in the instant issue, where testimony and
inspection of prisons may disrupt prison administration.1
In general, the evidentiary hearing will postpone resolution of prison cases
and create more work for over-burdened prison administrators.
Response
As the final chapter in extensive litigation, one additional evidentiary hearing will not unduly burden prison administrators. Because
530 U.S. 327, 345-51 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (revealing different interpretations of the

PLRA).

I9 See Hadix v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 662, 672 (6th Cir. 2000); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 102
F.
Supp. 2d 159, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining that the delay in rendering a decision on the
termination of relief was "in the interests of thoroughness and fairness").
140See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (ex-

pressing support for the canon of constitutional avoidance).
141 418 U.S. 539, 566
(1974).
1
For example, see the congressional testimony about frivolous litigation disrupting prison
administration and wasting resources, 141 CONG. REQ 14570 (1996).
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a monitoring mechanism will already be in place in most instances,
gathering evidence will be fairly routine. Although the Benjamin
court took over a year to review the new evidence and issue findings,
this may be due to the fact that the judge, not the plaintiffs, devised
the idea of having a pre-stay hearing.
Additionally, the case involved jails in New York City, which has one of the largest systems in
America.1 44
C. There Is No Due Process Right Involved, Since Consent Decrees
Do Not EstablishVested Rights
Due process only covers deprivations of life, liberty, or property,
the latter of which does not include a plaintiffs interest in prospective relief.'4 5 This position was articulated by former Assistant Attorney General Schmidt, testifying to Congress in defense of the PLRA:
"Sections 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3) do not violate the Due Process
Clause because injunctive decrees in prison conditions cases are
clearly not protected "property" interests .... Nor do plaintiffs have
any vested rights in the prospective relief afforded under a consent
decree."' 46 Given these considerations, plaintiffs may not argue that
an automatic stay of relief deprives them of property without due
process of law.
Response
The argument proposed for plaintiffs facing immediate termination and automatic stay of relief does not rest on a "vested rights" assertion. That is, plaintiffs do not assert that consent decrees cannot
be terminated by legislative changes to the underlying substantive
law. Rather, they assert that the way in which relief is terminated
through the courts violates one of the fundamental aspects of procedural due process, the right topresent evidence, any evidence, when
one's rights may be affected.47 Without at least a brief evidentiary

See Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (exemplifying the civil procedure
involved in prisoner civil rights cases).
144 See U.S.
Imprisonment Rate Doubles Over 12 Years, at http://cgi.cnn.com/US/
1

9903/14/us.prisons (Mar. 14, 1999) (noting that New York Cityjails hold 17,700 inmates on an
average day, second only to Los Angeles in the size of its municipal jail population).
See generally Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (discussing the limits of what will be
taken to be prisoners' property); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
146 See Testimony of John Schmidt, Associate Attorney General, 142 Cong. Rec.
1594-97
(1996) (questioning the constitutionality of certain alleged prisoner rights).
147 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (asserting the right to a fair hearing
before welfare benefits are terminated). Although prisoners do not have vested rights in the substantive
law, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 232 (1995), they have a procedural right to
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hearing, courts will have no way of ascertaining whether prisoners are
still being deprived of their constitutional or statutory rights. Without considering any new evidence, judges may stay remedial relief
that is actually due prisoners, even under the terms of the PLRA. It is
this possibility, made possible through the PLRA's time limit-not
the interests vested in prior consent decrees-that violates due process. The Miller majority opinion even noted this apparent defect in
the PLRA timing, without mention of the vested rights doctrine."' S
While there is no absolute right to admit evidence in one's defense,1 surely due process requires the ability to introduce some evidence when one's interests are being reviewed on an incomplete record.'- Even the most conservative members of the Supreme Court
have acknowledged
prisoners' rights of meaningful access to the
151
courts.

D. A BroadInterpretationof the PLRA Serves PublicPolicy in Terms
ofJudicialEconomy, Protection of State and Local Autonomy,
and Taxpayer Savings
In passing the PLRA, Congress responded to its constituents, the
rising volume of class action suits, and the questionable role of the
federal courts in prison litigation. 52 In 1966 there were 218 prisoner

a fair hearing when their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel or unusual punishment is endangered.
148Miller v. French, 530 U.S 327, 344 (2000) ("We leave open, therefore, the question
whether this time limit, particularly in a complex case, may implicate due process concerns.").
1 Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 62 (1996) (O'ConnorJ.,
dissenting).
150See id. (discussing the rights of inmates to admit evidence).
1 For example, see Justice Scalia's opinion in Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343 (1996).
152 See Criminal Oversight supra note 5, at A18 (noting that prisoner filings in federal
court
increased tenfold from 1975 to 1995). About two-thirds of prisoner suits are brought under
§ 1983 and about 94% of those plaintiff receive no relief. In 1990, over 1200 state prisons were
operating under some form of judicial supervision. See id. For this position, see 141 CONG.
REC. 14571 (1995) (including statements of Senators Dole and Abraham: "the bottom line is
that prisons should be prisons, not law firms"); 142 CONG. REC 23255 (1996) (presenting testimony about frivolous suits under § 1983); Testimony of Paul T. Cappuccio Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 1995 WL 451870 (July 27, 1995); Testimony of Laura A. Chamberlain,
Assistant Corporation Counsel, on behalf of the City of New York, Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 1996 WL 556532 (Sept. 26, 1996) (summarizing testimony of New York officials
about cost of improvements promised by former Mayor Koch). See also Robert Dole, Advocacy on
the Bench Has Gone Too Far,WASH. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1995, at A25.
Numerous commentators have expressed support for the PLRA. See, e.g., Laurie Smith
Camp, Wy NebraskaNeeds Prison Litigation Reform, 76 NEB. L. REV. 781 (1997); EugeneJ. Kuzinski, Note, The End of the Prison Law Firm?: Frivolous Inmate Litigation,Judicial Oversight, and the
Prison LitigationReform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS LJ. 361 (1998); Peter Hobart, Comment, The
Prison Litigation Reform Act: Striking the Balance Between Law and Order, 44 VILL L. REV. 981
(1999).
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suits in federal court and in 1995 there were 41,600.0 Prisoner suits
make up the largest category of federal civil rights cases.' 4 Prison
administration is the province of state and local governments.
To relieve prison officials and localities from the burden of unnecessary, existing consent decrees, Congress had to impose a time
limit before relief would be terminated.'5 Under the PLRA, relief
will not be terminated if judges find it is still necessary.lss Moreover,
for complicated cases, judges may use the full ninety days to review
areas in which they believe violations are ongoing, so that they may
issue findings to that effect and terminate the remaining, unnecessary
parts of the relief.
Response
A policy based on efficiency should not override constitutional
guarantees. The PLRA asks federal judges to stay and then to terminate prospective relief without regard to one of the fundamental aspects of procedural due process-the right to present evidence.
If policy is used to justify the PLRA and an infringement on prisoners' due process rights, perhaps its advocates should examine what
policies have caused prison litigation to reach its modern state. Many
consent decrees have been complicated and extended by the recalcitrance of prison administrators and the persistence of constitutional
violations within prisons. 57 The federal courts are not entirely to
blame for the explosion of the prison system that led to capacitybased violations. Criminal justice policies pursuant to the war on
drugs, particularly mandatory sentencing, have contributed to the
problem.""

Nonetheless, consent decrees do place burdens on municipal
budgets and some criticism of "activist" judges and mismanagement
of class action litigation is valid. The question remains: is termination of all consent decrees the correct response? Federal courts are
the guarantor of individual rights and the sometimes protector of
unpopular causes, as opposed to the more majoritarian legislative

15 Dorothy Schrader, Prison Civil Rights Litigation and the 1996 Reform Act, CONG. RES.
REP.
No. 96-468A, CRS-5 (1996).
154 See id. (discussing the dramatic increase in prisoner suits over the
last thirty years).
156See 141 CONG. RE. 14572 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (citing statistics compiled by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
1%See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (3) (2000).
157 See, e.g., Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311 (3d Cir. 1995) (referring
to a class
action having to do with overcrowding in prisons).
158 See generally CHRISnNAJ. JOHNS, POWER, IDEOLOGY, AND THE WAR ON
DRUGS: NOTHING
SUCCEEDS LIKE FAILURE (1992) (suggesting structural and ideological roots of crime, unreachable through deterrence and mainstream crime control).
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branch.'59 To curb activism on the bench, Congress may be justified
in placing limits on new prospective relief; "automatically" ending previous relief implicates other concerns. Those members of Congress
who supported the PLRA because they disapprove ofjudicial activism
in taking over prison systems should not punish prisoner plaintiffs for
this ideological disagreement. Plaintiffs deserve full and fair hearings
before promised improvements won through years of litigation are
abandoned.
Finally, ifjudicial economy is an important goal, the PLRA should
have as its focus individual pro se suits.'6 In the long run, class actions and consent decrees may be among the most efficient ways to
handle prisoners' grievances within a large prison system.
CONCLUSION

Senator Orrin Hatch, speaking to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary about implementing the PLRA, noted, "No one, of course,
would suggest that prison conditions that actually violate the Constitution should be allowed to persist.' 16' The trouble is that the PLRA
deprives judges of a fair opportunity to determine whether such conditions do, in fact, exist.
In raising procedural due process, plaintiffs may persuade courts
that the PLRA automatic stay is too expedited to ensure meaningful
determination of possible constitutional violations and remedies.
The timing issue is more likely to succeed than a variation on the
separation of powers argument or an appeal to broad federal equitable powers. Assessing the success of the due process argument for delayed stay of prospective relief requires a consideration not only of
the trends in congressional regulation of the federal courts, but also
the input of the Justice Department. Under the leadership of John
Ashcroft, the odds of a government endorsement of the due process
argument during the current presidential administration are quite
low. Presiding over a 1997 hearing on curbing judicial activism, Ashcroft lauded ideas such as new limitations on the jurisdiction of the
federal courts (suggested by former Attorney General Meese), reinstitution of three-judge panels, limits on equitable power, and proposed
extension of the procedural scheme of the PLRA to non-prison con-

159See Melissa L. Koehn, The New American Caste System: The Supreme Court and Discrimination
Among Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 49 (1998) (arguing against distinctions
between civil rights plaintiffs).
16)See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2000) (imposing filing fees rather than awarding in forma pauperis
status to prisoner plaintiffs).
161 141 CONG. REC.26,548 (1995) (testimony of Sen. Hatch).
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texts. 62 Ashcroft reminded his colleagues that "the Constitution does
not provide for a completely independent judiciary.".
By keeping
federal courts within their proper constitutional role, Ashcroft asserted that Congress "will not only restore the rights of the People,
but [it] will also be fulfilling [its] own proper constitutional role to
act as a check on judicial excess." 164
If protest over the PLRA and support for a new reading or reversal
does not come from above, it must come from below. Those advocating institutional reform litigation as a solution to prison conditions
must learn from the experience of school desegregation, another major twentieth-century litigation-driven movement. The most important lesson is how different these two movements have been. Although causal factors are certainly subject to great debate, it is clear
that the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education had a close
nexus with changing social consciousness about race and public policy. This accounts for the legitimacy with which many Americans,
eventually, regarded school reform litigation. The lack of such popular support for prisoners' rights may help account for the support for
strict limits on prison class actions. There are, however, important
similarities between school and prison cases. Many major school systems have been under some sort of federal court supervision and
have been involved in class action litigation spanning decades. '6 Although the courts have largely succeeded in eliminating overt racial
policies in public schools, the limits of equitable remedies are apparent. No court can regulate the patterns of inner city housing, suburban flight, and structural poverty that underlie substandard education in many schools with a majority of minority students.
The analogue has also emerged in prison litigation. Many of the
obstacles to a quick resolution of prison suits grew from the explosion
of prison populations in the 1980s and 1990s. Until there is social
support for rethinking prisons, the criminal justice system, and particularly domestic drug and mental health policies, the courts stand
powerless to effectuate meaningful change in America's prisons. This
development of a social movement of consciousness of prisoners'
16 SeeJudicial Activism: Potential Responses: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft, Chairman); see also Brian M. Hoffstadt, Retaking the
Field: The Constitutional Constraints on Federal Legislation that Displaces Consent Decrees,
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 53 (1999) (discussing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and other likely
legislative action to reign in tobacco class action litigation).
1631&
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For a similar articulation of this position, see Edwin Meese Ill, Symposium, Puttingthe

FederalJudiciaryBack on the ConstitutionalTrack, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781 (1998).
16 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
166 See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S 43 (1971); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S.
717 (1974).
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rights is unlikely, given the reviled position that convicted criminals
have in American sociopolitical culture. 67 It is for these groups, with
no majoritarian power in the democratic regime or sympathies for
their rights within the majority, that consent decrees may be most
precious.163
The ultimate effect of the PLRA is under dispute between some
scholars who label it a largely symbolic statute unlikely to have systematic effects'6 and others who predict a substantial impact on class
actions.'70 Those opposed to the PLRA, particularly the termination
of consent decrees, have focused on the structural and theoretical arguments. 7 These approaches have either been foreclosed by Miller
or made unlikely given the trends of equity jurisdiction in civil rights
litigation. Plaintiffs considering challenging a motion for termination have the best chance if they adopt a practical argument, criticizing the mechanism of the PLRA rather than its aims.

16 One major facet of political impotence of prisoners is their minority group status within
a
majoritarian legislative structure. For an academic construction of majoritarian politics concerning thejudiciary, seeJOHNHARTELY, DEMOCRACYANDDISrRUSr (1980).
163For a similar argument in the context of consent decrees for the homeless, see John Barlow Weiner, Institutional Reform Consent Decrees as Conservers of Social Progress, 27 COLUL HUL
RT5. L. REV. 355 (1996).
19 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologiesof the
Antiterrorimi and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison LitigationReform Act, 47 DUE LJ. 1
(1997).
1" See, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: ProceduralMeans of ObtainingSubstance,
39 ARIZ.L REV. 575, 580 (1997) ("Congress has sent a clear message that it wishes to restrict the
broad based remedies ordered by courts in prisoners' rights suits and possibly in other types of
public interest cases as well.").
1 See, e.g., Lynn S.Branham, Keeping the "Wolf Out of the Fold': Separation of Powers and CongressionalTermination ofEquitable Relief 26J. LEGIS. 185, 186 (2000) (questioning whether, under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Congress can "require a court to readjudicate a claim for
injunctive relief on which judgment was entered before the [PLRA] was enacted"); Ira Bloom,
Prisons, Prisoners, and Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the Wall SeparatingLegislativefrom Judicial
Power, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 389 (1998) (arguing that the rule of decision that Congress has prescribed for the PLRA virtually guarantees that the government will overcome any prisoner challenges); Theodore K. Cheng, Invadingan Article fII Court'sInherentEquitablePowers: Separationof
Powers and the Immediate TerminationProvisionsof the PrisonLitigationReform Act, 56 WASIL & LEE
L. REV. 969 (1999) (asserting that the PLRA unconstitutionally restricts the equitable powers of
the courts); Dennis Jacobs, Symposium, Introduction: Trust andJurisdiction-TheTug of War Between Congress and the FederalCourts, 22 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y55 (1998).

